Iraqis literally lining up to serve their country

Iraqis: Lining Up to Serve: Red State Rascals

If all Iraqi policeman do is get blown up by Al Qaida, then how could this be happening?“Over 1,200 Iraqi men came to Joint Security Station Yusufiyah during a three-day police recruitment drive which ended June 25. The drive which began June 23 had a goal of finding 200 qualified Iraqi Police recruits. When the drive began at 8 a.m., there were almost 200 men waiting in line to apply,” reported MNF-Iraq today. Gen. David Petraeus visited the recruitment efforts the first day and spoke to several potential recruits and encouraged them to serve their country. 577 applicants were processed the first day. Another 150 were waiting in line the second day and by mid-afternoon 361 had filled out applications and spoken with the troops coordinating the drive. Iraqis are stepping up–literally. It is time that we do the same: Support The Surge!

JD Johannes slaps around defeatist Lugar

"Is it possible to win a war on the ground, and lose it in Congress? Perhaps. In his Senate-floor speech Monday, Senator Richard Lugar announced, “In my judgment, our course in Iraq has lost contact with our vital national security interests in the Middle East and beyond…The prospects that the current ‘surge’ strategy will succeed in the way originally envisioned by the president are very limited within the short period framed by our own domestic-policy debate.” The Indiana Republican endorses a downsizing and redeployment of the U.S. military mission in Iraq as an essential precondition to reasserting these vital national-security interests, which he defines thus:1) To prevent any piece of Iraq from being a terrorist safe haven;2) To prevent Iraqi sectarian violence from spilling over into any other parts of the region;3) To prevent Iranian domination of the region; and4) To prevent a loss of U.S. credibility in the region.All four of these goals are being advanced, some of them dramatically, by the surge strategy of Gen. David Petraeus — the very strategy that Sen. Lugar would scrap in favor of “downsizing and redeployment.”The principal accomplishment of the surge to date is solidifying the “Anbar Awakening,” the significance of which has been under-reported by the media and ill-understood by the public. If any piece of territory in Iraq qualified as a “terrorist safe haven,” it was bloody Anbar. This province of little over 1 million people — 4.5 percent of Iraq’s population — has accounted for 34.6 percent of U.S. casualties. (Insurgent activity in Baghdad, with five times the population, has accounted for fewer troop deaths both as a percent (29.5 percent) and in absolute numbers (1,052).The virtual extinction of the insurgency in the province — a victory that I was privileged to witness first-hand — represented not some momentary quirk of tribal alliances, but a diligent application of the revised tactics that coalition forces have implemented under skilled, battle-proven officers and Gen. Petraeus. These tactics include meticulous census-taking of persons and vehicles; skilled, persistent diplomacy with tribal leaders; incorporation of local intelligence; constant foot patrols in the residential areas from platoon and squad sized outposts; and persistent perimeter control of areas cleared and held.Even Lugar acknowledges the effectiveness of these tactics. He stated, “I do not doubt the assessments of military commanders that there has been some progress in security…We should attempt to preserve initiatives that have shown promise, such as engaging Sunni groups that are disaffected with the extreme tactics and agenda of al Qaeda in Iraq.” But it is hard to see how redeployment to Kuwait, or the Kurdish provinces, or hunkering down in large bases in the outlying desert will preserve this progress, let alone extend it.Lugar’s second and third national-security goals are inextricably interlinked. The fingerprints of Iran are everywhere evident in Iraq’s sectarian violence — and on both sides. Iranian munitions are wending their way to al Qaeda operatives, even as rogue Shiite militias receive training and arms from Iranian military intelligence. The explosion of sectarian violence in late 2005 was not an indigenous development. The principle instigators — al Qaeda, Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria — promoted it to prevent the establishment of a stable democratic regime in Iraq, and to drive us from the region. If they succeed in Iraq, they will export of these tactics to other parts of the Middle East. It is delusional to believe that a regional spillover of sectarian violence can be averted by allowing such violence to fester in Iraq. At the same time, sectarian violence is not an innate feature of Iraq: Iraqis of different sects and ethnicities lived peacefully together in Baghdad for centuries — often in the same neighborhoods, and in the same tribes. Even today, it is not rare to for a Sunni head of household, driven from his home by a threat of violence, to ask his Shi’ite neighbor to watch his family’s property for him until he can return. The force, and the tactics, that can accomplish the first three of Lugar’s policy goals is already deployed. The senator’s proposed drawdown would undermine those goals, and thus assure the loss of U.S. credibility in the region. As a replacement for the surge tactics that have crippled the insurgency in its most potent nest, Lugar offers a single paragraph to describe what redeployment should look like. “Numerous locations for temporary or permanent military bases have been suggested,” he told Congress, “including Kuwait or other nearby states, the Kurdish territories, or defensible locations in Iraq outside of urban areas.” There is little to criticize here — literally. The senator expended more words on the national-security significance of corn-fed ethanol, grown in the Midwest, than on the nature of the “Plan B” redeployment. This is the same man who solemnly warned us, “In 2003, we witnessed the costs that came with insufficient planning.” Lugar bases his plea for downsizing and redeployment on three premises: the state of the Iraqi government, the stress of the war on our military, and the “constraints of our domestic political timetable.” The first two are canards. Dysfunction within the Iraqi government should take a back seat to the U.S. interest in stabilizing the regime. Yes, there are factions in the Iraqi parliament that want Iranian domination; yes, there are factions that will plunder the Iraqi treasury. But there are also factions that want stabilization and that look to us for protection and arbitration. We are ill-served when we let the former frame our public debate.Much was made in the American press, for instance, of the “anti-fence” law introduced by the Sadrists during the early phases of the surge. Lugar cites it. He is blissfully unaware that Baghdad residents build their own security walls in response to neighborhood violence. They do it because it works, rendering checkpoints effective in blocking terrorist infiltration. We do it too — only better. The Sadrists, whose militias would “cleanse” certain Baghdad neighborhoods of Sunnis, scored a major PR victory with American civil libertarians through a legislative act that most Baghdadis regarded as absurd. Lugar also advances a truism, that the engagement in Iraq stresses our military personnel. War opponents often raise this issue, so easily graphed in Power Point presentations. But I saw what no Power Point can demonstrate: The quality of combat power we bring to bear has improved from 2005 (my previous stint as an embed) to 2007. I was stunned by the number of infantrymen who are reenlisting, maintaining a core of corporate knowledge on how to fight this war. The young men coming into the infantry today know what they are getting into, and are eminently capable of meeting the challenge.This leaves Lugar’s third, and most potent objection to a continuation of the “surge”: “Some will argue,” he told the Senate, “that political timelines should always be subordinated to military necessity, but that is unrealistic in a democracy.”Lugar is saying, “Because we lack the will to win, let us make a decision not to win, and thus reassert our will.” This is particularly untimely now, when our military has accomplished one of the most stunning successes of this prolonged struggle. Alexander Hamilton’s analysis on much the same question, which preceded Lugar’s caveat by more than two centuries, is worth noting as well. Describing the subordinate role of Congress to the executive in foreign policy, Hamilton wrote in Federalist 75: “Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous.” The Petraeus surge, authorized by the executive branch, was not “improvised.” Its fundamental planning dates from early in Donald Rumsfeld’s stint as secretary of Defense, where it was developed as a contingency plan should a “light footprint” approach fail. It deserves its day in the sun. And its recent success should not be held against it. www.nationalreview.com

The attrition of our enemies

Reasons to reexamine the Middle East’s negative prognosis.

By Victor Davis Hanson The majority opinion is that the occupation in Iraq has been so bungled that the blowback has ruined American efforts at promoting positive change throughout the Middle East. Perhaps. But for all the justifiable criticism of the Iraqi reconstruction, two truths still remain — the United States is taking an enormous toll on jihadists, and despite the terrible cost in blood and treasure, has not given up on a constitutional government in Iraq. The Sunni front-line states, who subsidized jihadists and still enjoy our misery in Iraq , , but they are now terrified that these killers, in league with the Iranians, will turn on them. The net result is not just that some Sunnis are helping us in Iraq, but that they are being urged to for the first time by those in the Arab world, who would prefer to see the Iraqi government, rather than the terrorists, succeed. And if Iraq is still a terrible disappointment, Kurdistan is emerging as a success few envisioned, refuting some conventional wisdom about the incompatibility of capitalism and constitutional government with Middle Eastern Islam.Theocratic Iran is not exactly as “empowered” as is generally alleged, but in the greatest crisis of its miserable existence. As the mullahs up the ante in the region, they could very soon not only lose Iraq, but also their own dictatorship. Trying to oppose the West in Iraq, Lebanon, and the West Bank is taking an enormous financial toll, as is the general isolation from the world community.With oil prices at an all-time high, Iran can't provide gasoline for its own people, who resent the billions spent instead on Arab terrorists abroad. If oil were to dip from near $70 to $50-55 a barrel, the regime would face abject bankruptcy. For all the criticism of the U.S. position, from the left and right, we have now found the right blend of military determination not to let Teheran go nuclear, combined with economic and political efforts at containment. There is an array of future options — stronger embargoes, blockades, and military strikes on infrastructure — still on the table. The social unrest the mullahs desire in Iraq is starting to spill over the border into their own Iran, and its magnitude and final course are still unpredictable.Syria for all its terror still can't overthrow the government in Lebanon, but has managed the impossible: Not only does the Arab world seek to isolate it, but France and the United States are cooperating to thwart it in Lebanon. The last thing we want to do is to give its terror industry the legitimacy it craves by sending any more officials over to Damascus.Hamas is high on victory in Gaza for now, but all it has accomplished is to further concentrate its nexus of terror into one small miserable — and quite vulnerable — locale in the midst of Jordan, Israel, and Egypt, while sacrificing the Palestinians greatest advantage: deniability of culpability. It will be harder now for the tired good cop/bad cop excuses, “militant wing,” etc. and all the other justifications for terror that the Palestinians use. Since Hamas bragged that it had routed (it matters less whether true or false) the Palestinian Authority from Gaza, the next barrage of rocket attacks from there, rightly or wrongly, will liberate Israel in its response from the past worries of collateral damage. For all the talk of losing the Lebanon War, it is Iran and Syria, not Israel, that are stuck with billions in reconstruction costs for their battered Shiite pawns on the front lines.After four years of war and acrimony, things are starting to reach a point of resolution. Both the resources of the United States and its enemies are becoming strained, but so far they are rioting in oil-exporting Iran over gasoline, not we in the U.S. Europe has gravitated more in the last four years to our views than we to theirs, especially in regard to the dangers of radical Islam. Israel lost some of its precious capital of deterrence in the last war, but ultimately the real loser was a bankrupt Iran who lost far more materially than did a far wealthier Israel. Iran unleashed terror in the region, but found its own terrorist credentials no exemption from what it wrought.Because violence per se is the only narrative from the Middle East, and often editorialized as deriving from U.S. blunders, we are in a state of constant depression. But things are not as bad as they seem, and could still turn out far better than anyone might imagine — if we give the gifted Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker the support and time they need to make the necessary military and diplomatic changes.

Iraqi civilians continue to help US troops

Taji's 'Neighborhood Watch' Turns Over Cache- Iraqi citizens stop suspicious vehicle, turn in weapons.

By Maj. Randall Baucom1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division CAMP TAJI, Iraq, June 27, 2007 — For a second time this week, Iraqi citizens here turned in a large cache consisting of improvised explosive device-making material and mortar rounds. The Taji neighborhood watch contacted Coalition Forces June 25, after the driver of a truck fled the scene when the volunteers stopped a suspicious vehicle moving through the rural village of Abd Allah al Jasim. The vehicle contained 24 mortar rounds, two rockets, spare machine gun barrels, small arms ammunition and other IED-making material. "This grassroots movement of reconciliation by the volunteers is taking off all around us. The tribes that had once actively or passively supported al-Qaeda in Iraq now want them out," said Lt. Col. Peter Andrysiak, the deputy commander of the 1st "Ironhorse" Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. The neighborhood watch is made up of a group of 500 volunteers, from a number of tribes in the area, who want reconciliation with the Coalition Forces and the Iraqi government. The volunteers are currently being vetted for possible future selection for training as Iraqi Police or some other organization within the Iraqi Security Forces. Mortar rounds and other improvised explosive device-making materials were turned over to Coalition Forces by the "Neighborhood Watch" in Taji, Iraq June 25. U.S. Army photo

Kilcullen lays out strategy for victory

I’ve spent much of the last six weeks out on the ground, working with Iraqi and U.S. combat units, civilian reconstruction teams, Iraqi administrators and tribal and community leaders. I’ve been away from e-mail a lot, so unable to post here at SWJ: but I’d like to make up for that now by providing colleagues with a basic understanding of what’s happening, right now, in Iraq. This post is not about whether current ops are “working” — for us, here on the ground, time will tell, though some observers elsewhere seem to have already made up their minds (on the basis of what evidence, I’m not really sure). But for professional counterinsurgency operators such as our SWJ community, the thing to understand at this point is the intention and concept behind current ops in Iraq: if you grasp this, you can tell for yourself how the operations are going, without relying on armchair pundits. So in the interests of self-education (and cutting out the commentariat middlemen—sorry, guys) here is a field perspective on current operations. Ten days ago, speaking with Austin Bay, I made the following comment: “I know some people in the media are already starting to sort of write off the “surge” and say ‘Hey, hang on: we’ve been going since January, we haven’t seen a massive turnaround; it mustn’t be working’. What we’ve been doing to date is putting forces into position. We haven’t actually started what I would call the “surge” yet. All we’ve been doing is building up forces and trying to secure the population. And what I would say to people who say that it’s already failed is “watch this space”. Because you’re going to see, in fairly short order, some changes in the way we’re operating that will make what’s been happening over the past few months look like what it is—just a preliminary build up.” The meaning of that comment should be clear by now to anyone tracking what is happening in Iraq. On June 15th we kicked off a major series of division-sized operations in Baghdad and the surrounding provinces. As General Odierno said, we have finished the build-up phase and are now beginning the actual “surge of operations”. I have often said that we need to give this time. That is still true. But this is the end of the beginning: we are now starting to put things onto a viable long-term footing. These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another, and to create an operational synergy between what we're doing in Baghdad and what's happening outside. Unlike on previous occasions, we don't plan to leave these areas once they’re secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that have "gone quiet" as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action. When we speak of "clearing" an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation. If we don't get every enemy cell in the initial operation, that's OK. The point of the operations is to lift the pall of fear from population groups that have been intimidated and exploited by terrorists to date, then win them over and work with them in partnership to clean out the cells that remain – as has happened in Al Anbar Province and can happen elsewhere in Iraq as well. The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why claims that “80% of AQ leadership have fled” don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather to drive them off the population and keep them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return. This is not some sort of kind-hearted, soft approach, as some fire-breathing polemicists have claimed (funnily enough, those who urge us to “just kill more bad guys” usually do so from a safe distance). It is not about being “nice” to the population and hoping they will somehow see us as the “good guys” and stop supporting insurgents. On the contrary, it is based on a hard-headed recognition of certain basic facts, to wit:(a) The enemy needs the people to act in certain ways (sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation) in order to survive and further his strategy. Unless the population acts in these ways, both insurgents and terrorists will wither, and the cycle of provocation and backlash that drives the sectarian conflict in Iraq will fail.(b) The enemy is fluid, but the population is fixed. (The enemy is fluid because he has no permanent installations he needs to defend, and can always run away to fight another day. But the population is fixed, because people are tied to their homes, businesses, farms, tribal areas, relatives etc). Therefore—and this is the major change in our strategy this year—protecting and controlling the population is do-able, but destroying the enemy is not. We can drive him off from the population, then introduce local security forces, population control, and economic and political development, and thereby "hard-wire" the enemy out of the environment, preventing his return. But chasing enemy cells around the countryside is not only a waste of time, it is precisely the sort of action he wants to provoke us into. That’s why AQ cells leaving an area are not the main game—they are a distraction. We played the enemy’s game for too long: not any more. Now it is time for him to play our game. © Being fluid, the enemy can control his loss rate and therefore can never be eradicated by purely enemy-centric means: he can just go to ground if the pressure becomes too much. BUT, because he needs the population to act in certain ways in order to survive, we can asphyxiate him by cutting him off from the people. And he can't just "go quiet" to avoid that threat. He has either to come out of the woodwork, fight us and be destroyed, or stay quiet and accept permanent marginalization from his former population base. That puts him on the horns of a lethal dilemma (which warms my heart, quite frankly, after the cynical obscenities these irhabi gang members have inflicted on the innocent Iraqi non-combatant population). That's the intent here.(e) The enemy may not be identifiable, but the population is. In any given area in Iraq, there are multiple threat groups but only one, or sometimes two main local population groups. We could do (and have done, in the past) enormous damage to potential supporters, "destroying the haystack to find the needle", but we don't need to: we know who the population is that we need to protect, we know where they live, and we can protect them without unbearable disruption to their lives. And more to the point, we can help them protect themselves, with our forces and ISF in overwatch. Of course, we still go after all the terrorist and extremist leaders we can target and find, and life has become increasingly “nasty, brutish, and short” for this crowd. But we realize that this is just a shaping activity in support of the main effort, which is securing the Iraqi people from the terrorists, extremist militias, and insurgents who need them to survive. Is there a strategic risk involved in this series of operations? Absolutely. Nothing in war is risk-free. We have chosen to accept and manage this risk, primarily because a low-risk option simply will not get us the operational effects that the strategic situation demands. We have to play the hand we have been dealt as intelligently as possible, so we're doing what has to be done. It still might not work, but "it is what it is" at this point.So much for theory. The practice, as always, has been mixed. Personally, I think we are doing reasonably well and casualties have been lower so far than I feared. Every single loss is a tragedy. But so far, thank God, the loss rate has not been too terrible: casualties are up in absolute terms, but down as a proportion of troops deployed (in the fourth quarter of 2006 we had about 100,000 troops in country and casualties averaged 90 deaths a month; now we have almost 160,000 troops in country but deaths are under 120 per month, much less than a proportionate increase, which would have been around 150 a month). And last year we patrolled rarely, mainly in vehicles, and got hit almost every time we went out. Now we patrol all the time, on foot, by day and night with Iraqi units normally present as partners, and the chances of getting hit are much lower on each patrol. We are finally coming out of the "defensive crouch" with which we used to approach the environment, and it is starting to pay off. It will be a long, hard summer, with much pain and loss to come, and things could still go either way. But the population-centric approach is the beginning of a process that aims to put the overall campaign onto a sustainable long-term footing. The politics of the matter then can be decisive, provided the Iraqis use the time we have bought for them to reach the essential accommodation. The Embassy and MNF-I continue to work on these issues at the highest levels but fundamentally, this is something that only Iraqis can resolve: our role is to provide an environment in which it becomes possible. All this may change. These are long-term operations: the enemy will adapt and we'll have to adjust what we're doing over time. Baq’ubah, Arab Jabour and the western operations are progressing well, and additional security measures in place in Baghdad have successfully tamped down some of the spill-over of violence from other places. The relatively muted response (so far) to the second Samarra bombing is evidence of this. Time will tell, though.... Once again, none of this is intended to tell you “what to think” or “whether it’s working”. We’re all professional adults, and you can work that out for yourself. But this does, I hope, explain some of the thinking behind what we are doing, and it may therefore make it easier for people to come to their own judgment. David Kilcullen is Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser, Multi-National Force—Iraq. These are his personal views only.

General mattis: we are winning in Iraq

http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/06/22/news/top_stories/1_01_046_21_07.txt The increasing Sunni tribal cooperation with U.S. troops in Iraq's Anbar province has al-Qaida-linked insurgents on the run, General Mattis said. "I caution people that this is not irreversible," he said. "But at the same time, we are winning and the enemy is losing."Mattis' comments were echoed by Marine Brig. Gen. John Allen, deputy commander of U.S. forces in Anbar, who said Wednesday that insurgents have been pushed out of highly populated areas.During a December interview with the newspaper, the blunt-talking Mattis predicted such a shift as the Sunnis who dominate the region west of Baghdad became increasingly disenchanted with civilian killings.About 8,000 Camp Pendleton Marines are now in Iraq, including members of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which just arrived. The local Marines are the latest unit to join the troop buildup ordered by President Bush earlier this year, a decision made despite waning congressional and popular support for the war.Regarded by some as one of the most astute and aggressive generals in the Marine Corps, Mattis stressed that the U.S. is not directly arming any Sunni groups, as published reports have indicated.The Sunni groups have their own weapons, and rather than arming them, U.S. forces are helping train them as part of the security and police forces. Sunnis comprise a minority of Iraq's population and have been part of the insurgency since it first emerged in the summer of 2003.How it happenedIraqis who had been sympathetic to the insurgency became disenchanted as al-Qaida forces carried out murders of young boys and a local sheik who didn't respond to their overtures, Mattis said."These were mistakes," he said of those killings and how the incidents created an opportunity for the U.S. to make new alliances. "And war, at times, is decided by whoever makes the fewest mistakes."Marines in the vast Anbar region, where more of their forces have been killed and injured than any other in Iraq, now routinely get tips to the location of roadside bombs.As a result, a majority of the deadly devices are now being discovered before they are detonated, resulting in sharp reductions in troop deaths. Anbar residents also routinely report where the insurgents can be found, calling in the information to telephone tip lines that the military has established, Mattis said.Despite the progress, Mattis cautioned that bombs remain a constant threat."There are still going to be good days and bad days out there," he said. "We cannot get complacent, but at the same time, our progress is undeniable."If the violence continues to subside, Mattis said, Sunni forces can be redirected into job training programs. Disbanding those forces, as the U.S. leadership did with the Iraqi army shortly after troops reached Baghdad, would, in his view, be a mistake, the general said."As I recall, that didn't work out to well the first time," he said, referring to suddenly jobless soldiers taking up arms against coalition forces.Media portrayalSitting on one of two high-backed chairs that face a sofa inside his office, Mattis expressed repeated frustration over media portrayals of the war.Insurgent attacks are reported as "a car bomb went off in Baghdad today," he said. The general said the reports all too often do not actively pin the deadliness of the bombs on enemy forces.But when civilians are mistakenly killed by U.S. forces, the media portrays such incidents as examples of severe ethical failings, he said, citing recent examples of inadvertent civilian deaths from U.S. bombs and small-arms attacks."A (insurgent) bombing is reported like it was an act of God," said Mattis, whose job includes being the authority over two ongoing prosecutions of Camp Pendleton Marines accused of murder in the deaths of Iraqi civilians. "You can see the moral bye ---- the passive voice given to the enemy's intentional murder."The insurgency counts on negative portrayals of U.S. forces in Iraq and in the U.S., he said, adding that he believes the battle for hearts and minds is being played out in news reports."This enemy has decided that the war, the real war for them, will be fought in the narrative in the media."Who is Gen. Mattis?In the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Mattis commanded Camp Pendleton's 1st Marine Division, and in 2001 led a combat force in southern Afghanistan, making him one of the most experienced combat commanders among Marine generals.Washington Post reporter Thomas Ricks wrote extensively on Mattis in his 2006 book, "Fiasco," that tells how the U.S. got into Iraq and the mistakes made in the subsequent occupation."Mattis is unusual in many ways, most notably in being one of the more intense intellectuals in the U.S. military," Ricks wrote.A bachelor, Mattis helped write a manual on how to fight an insurgency, and requires his officers to plow through an exhaustive reading list. And as Ricks reported, Mattis once owned thousands of books until he gave most away in 2005, reducing his personal library to around 1,000.During three conversations with the North County Times over the 12 months, Mattis routinely referred to Alexander the Great, Mao, and a variety of historical figures."Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face nothing new under the sun," he once wrote in an e-mail that was recounted in Ricks' book.His blunt style got him in trouble in late 2004, when he was quoted as telling a gathering a gathering of military contractors and officers in San Diego that "it's fun to shoot some people." That prompted a rebuke from the commandant of the Marine Corps, but it was during that same address that Ricks reported he made a more telling comment."Don't patronize this enemy," he also said that day. "They mean business. They mean every word they say."

Why would Al Qaeda need torture chambers?

Al-Qaeda 'execution den' uncovered in Iraq Article from: Agence France-Presse From correspondents in Baghdad June 25, 2007 04:13pm US and Iraqi forces fighting their way through the restive Iraqi town of Baquba have discovered what appears to be an al-Qaeda-run "execution house". US and Iraqi forces "discovered the execution house using information from local citizens, who said it had been used by al-Qaeda,'' a statement by the US Military said. "Soldiers searching the house found five bodies buried in the yard behind the building and bloody clothes in several rooms inside it.'' A nearby house "had been converted into an illegal prison with several numbered rooms and bars covering the building's windows. Several blindfolds were found inside,'' the statement added. The announcement comes on the sixth day of a major air and ground assault on the city of Baquba northeast of Baghdad, which US commanders say has long been a stronghold for al-Qaeda in Iraq. The operation has seen US and Iraqi forces making their way through a dense urban labyrinth of booby traps and buried bombs, with entire houses rigged with explosives by insurgents who melted away at the beginning of the assault. US and Iraqi forces have defused 52 roadside bombs and destroyed 17 "booby-trapped structures'', the statement said. "The fact that we continue to find these booby-trapped houses filled with explosives and torture chambers only reaffirms that al-Qaeda has no regard for the safety and welfare of the people of Baquba,'' Colonel Gary Patton said. Since the operation, dubbed Arrowhead Ripper began last week, US and Iraqi forces have killed at least 58 suspected al-Qaeda militants, detained another 60, the US military said. But on Friday the number two US commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, admitted that as with past assaults most of the senior al-Qaeda leadership fled the city ahead of the invasion.

7 fewer al qaeda in anbar province

Notorious Al-Qaeda chief killed in American military operation in Iraq http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1756802&Language=en BAGHDAD, June 22 (KUNA) -- American forces in Iraq have killed a leader of the banned Al-Qaeda organization in the province of Al-Anbar west of the Iraqi capital, the army said in a statement released on Friday. Hussein Awad Hawwawi, also known as Abu Thabet, was killed in a raid launched against hideouts of the insurgents in southeast of Al-Karma in Al-Anbar. The assaulting forces, targeting several buildings for the gummen, engaged in a firefight with seven armed men, killing six and wounding one. The latter was taken to hospital for treament. Al-Hawwawi was identified among the gunmen who were shot dead in the firefight, it said, adding that the American forces searched the region, found propaganda leaflets and letters congratulating him for fleeing prison, in addition to explosives, arms, hand-grenades. Nine other gunmen were also detained in the mop-up operation. The slain Qaeda leader had been involved in concections with outlaws in northern Africa. He had been held in a prison in Mosul for illegal entry into the country, but fled on March 6. The army statement confirmed that he spearheaded trafficking of 30 warriors from North Africa to Iraq and carrying out suicidal attacks in the country. KUNA 221210 Jun 07NNNN

More efforts in diyala winning the war

Baqubah's Biometric Squeeze http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/06/the_presence_of.html By Noah Shachtman 10,000 U.S. troops have surrounded western neighborhoods in the Iraqi city of Baqubah. The goal "is not merely to reclaim [it] from insurgent control, but to capture or kill the estimated 300 fighters to 500 [Al Qaeda] fighters who are believed to be based" there, according to the New York Times. But with so many civilians -- nearly 300,000 -- in Baqubah, the Islamists can easily blend with the local population. "To frustrate such plans, the Americans intend to take fingerprints and other biometric data from every resident who seems to be a potential fighter after they and Iraqi forces have gained control of the western side of the city. The Americans will also test for the presence of explosive material on suspects’ hands." These biometric sweeps are becoming an increasingly common U.S. tactic in Iraq. American forces are fingerprinting new militia allies. Advisers training the Iraqi police have been fingerprinting recruits -- and cross-checking the results against Saddam's old biometric databases. Marines in Anbar province have done an end-run around the Pentagon bureaucracy to get fingerprint scanners into the field. Now, $320 million from the latest war-funding bill will go towards biometric programs.

Good News in Iraq- Winning on Offense

http://www.nypost.com/seven/06212007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/winning_on_offense_opedcolumnists_ralph_peters.htm By RALPH PETERS June 21, 2007 -- HALLELUJAH! For the first time since Baghdad fell, our military in Iraq has a comprehensive, integrated plan to defeat our enemies. Until now, our efforts have always been piecemeal, stop-start affairs. Even our success in the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004 went unexploited. Things have changed. And terrorists, not just Iraqi civilians, are dying. The 10,000-man operation reported in the Baquba area is only one part of a broader effort. In the words of a well-placed officer in Baghdad, "Operations like that are going on around Fallujah, Salman Pak, in Eastern Anbar, the belts around Baghdad, in Arab Jabour, outside of Taji and throughout the Diyala River Valley." This widespread offensive against al Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorists is part of a carefully developed, phased plan. The first step as the troop surge proceeded was to establish livable conditions in key neighborhoods of the capital. That step was vital, but insufficient in itself. Terrorists fled, but they didn't disappear. They just sought refuge elsewhere. And while neighborhood pacification involved aggressive tactical actions, it ultimately put our forces in a defensive posture. And you can't win solely by playing defense, either in the NFL or in war. Gen. David Petraeus understood that. He's done things methodically, operating from a coherent design - not just reacting as was our practice in the past, but imposing our will on the enemy. After regaining lost ground in Baghdad and exploiting Sunni Arab disillusionment with al Qaeda in Anbar Province, our military took the offensive. We pushed the enemy off "our" turf. Now we're going after "their" turf. This balance between defensive and offensive operations, integrated across central Iraq, is the first time we've seen a classic approach to military operations in post-Saddam Iraq. Amazing, but true. What hurdles lie ahead? First, it remains an open question whether we've got enough boots on the ground. While Petraeus and his team are using our forces with remarkable efficiency, there ain't no more to send. The second, enduring question is whether the Iraqis will finally knock off their squabbling and shoulder their share of the burden. Petraeus is giving us a lesson in skillful generalship, employing U.S. troops where he must, Iraqis where he can. But, in the end, we can't win this unless the Iraqis win it for themselves. Pious statements about "brave Iraqis" only get us so far: We're still only buying time - and no one can pretend that time isn't running out. Which brings us to the home front, where the war just might be lost, no matter what progress we make on the ground. Political hucksterism and poll-pandering on Capitol Hill amount to stabbing our troops in the back. Period. The insistence that success or failure will be determined beyond doubt by September is pure political quackery. The military operations and political maneuvering in Iraq are infernally complex. The earliest we might know anything will be around Thanksgiving - and all we'll know then is whether or not the Iraqis are getting on board in a serious way. After four lost years, we need to have realistic expectations - unless we intend to throw the game for domestic political reasons. Gen. Petraeus is playing a bad hand with greater skill than we had any right to expect. He's making meaningful tactical progress. We don't yet know if that will translate into a strategic turnaround - but, for God's sake, let's give him a chance. And let's not lose sight of our own national-security priority, which is defeating al Qaeda. Terror International is having a really bad time in Iraq these days: More and more Sunni Arabs are breaking with al Qaeda and its affiliates over their insufferable brutality. The Baquba-area operations involve former enemies now fighting on our side against the foreign terrorists. That's not just good news for Iraq. It's good news for America. Much could still go wrong. We don't know if those Sunni Arabs will keep faith with us over the longer term - and now the Shias who control the government are bewailing our new local alliances. Sunni Arabs have realized at last that they've got to "cooperate to graduate." Now the Shia are the ones who insist on playing a zero-sum game. And, of course, we never eliminated Muqtada al-Sadr. For which we're going to be even sorrier than we are now. Still, there's reason for sober optimism at the moment: We've finally got a coherent approach to defeating our enemies, not just parrying them. It looks like our military leaders have gotten serious at last. God help us, it almost looks like we want to win.

Good News in Iraq- Winning on Offense

http://www.nypost.com/seven/06212007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/winning_on_offense_opedcolumnists_ralph_peters.htm By RALPH PETERS June 21, 2007 -- HALLELUJAH! For the first time since Baghdad fell, our military in Iraq has a comprehensive, integrated plan to defeat our enemies. Until now, our efforts have always been piecemeal, stop-start affairs. Even our success in the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004 went unexploited. Things have changed. And terrorists, not just Iraqi civilians, are dying. The 10,000-man operation reported in the Baquba area is only one part of a broader effort. In the words of a well-placed officer in Baghdad, "Operations like that are going on around Fallujah, Salman Pak, in Eastern Anbar, the belts around Baghdad, in Arab Jabour, outside of Taji and throughout the Diyala River Valley." This widespread offensive against al Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorists is part of a carefully developed, phased plan. The first step as the troop surge proceeded was to establish livable conditions in key neighborhoods of the capital. That step was vital, but insufficient in itself. Terrorists fled, but they didn't disappear. They just sought refuge elsewhere. And while neighborhood pacification involved aggressive tactical actions, it ultimately put our forces in a defensive posture. And you can't win solely by playing defense, either in the NFL or in war. Gen. David Petraeus understood that. He's done things methodically, operating from a coherent design - not just reacting as was our practice in the past, but imposing our will on the enemy. After regaining lost ground in Baghdad and exploiting Sunni Arab disillusionment with al Qaeda in Anbar Province, our military took the offensive. We pushed the enemy off "our" turf. Now we're going after "their" turf. This balance between defensive and offensive operations, integrated across central Iraq, is the first time we've seen a classic approach to military operations in post-Saddam Iraq. Amazing, but true. What hurdles lie ahead? First, it remains an open question whether we've got enough boots on the ground. While Petraeus and his team are using our forces with remarkable efficiency, there ain't no more to send. The second, enduring question is whether the Iraqis will finally knock off their squabbling and shoulder their share of the burden. Petraeus is giving us a lesson in skillful generalship, employing U.S. troops where he must, Iraqis where he can. But, in the end, we can't win this unless the Iraqis win it for themselves. Pious statements about "brave Iraqis" only get us so far: We're still only buying time - and no one can pretend that time isn't running out. Which brings us to the home front, where the war just might be lost, no matter what progress we make on the ground. Political hucksterism and poll-pandering on Capitol Hill amount to stabbing our troops in the back. Period. The insistence that success or failure will be determined beyond doubt by September is pure political quackery. The military operations and political maneuvering in Iraq are infernally complex. The earliest we might know anything will be around Thanksgiving - and all we'll know then is whether or not the Iraqis are getting on board in a serious way. After four lost years, we need to have realistic expectations - unless we intend to throw the game for domestic political reasons. Gen. Petraeus is playing a bad hand with greater skill than we had any right to expect. He's making meaningful tactical progress. We don't yet know if that will translate into a strategic turnaround - but, for God's sake, let's give him a chance. And let's not lose sight of our own national-security priority, which is defeating al Qaeda. Terror International is having a really bad time in Iraq these days: More and more Sunni Arabs are breaking with al Qaeda and its affiliates over their insufferable brutality. The Baquba-area operations involve former enemies now fighting on our side against the foreign terrorists. That's not just good news for Iraq. It's good news for America. Much could still go wrong. We don't know if those Sunni Arabs will keep faith with us over the longer term - and now the Shias who control the government are bewailing our new local alliances. Sunni Arabs have realized at last that they've got to "cooperate to graduate." Now the Shia are the ones who insist on playing a zero-sum game. And, of course, we never eliminated Muqtada al-Sadr. For which we're going to be even sorrier than we are now. Still, there's reason for sober optimism at the moment: We've finally got a coherent approach to defeating our enemies, not just parrying them. It looks like our military leaders have gotten serious at last. God help us, it almost looks like we want to win.

Iraqi tribes helping US forces against AQI..

Iraqi Tribes help U.S. against Al-Qaeda By Jim Michaels, USA TODAY http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-06-20-tribes-iraq_N.htm 20 June BAGHDAD — More than 10 Iraqi tribes in the Baghdad area have reached agreements with U.S. and Iraqi forces for the first time to oppose al-Qaeda, raising the U.S. military's hopes that a trend started in western Iraq is spreading here. Some of the groups, which have members who fought alongside al-Qaeda in the past, have been providing useful intelligence to U.S. forces about their former allies, according to the U.S. military. "They know where they live and who they are," said Lt. Col. Rick Welch, a staff officer who works with tribes in the capital area. "They know how they operate." Some tribes are also taking up arms against al-Qaeda allies. About 100 tribes live in greater Baghdad. Many of these clans are groups of relatives who share the same name and have thousands of members.U.S. commanders have reached similar deals in Sunni-dominated Anbar province in western Iraq. Attacks there have dropped by 60% in the last year, according to the U.S. military. Tribes in Diyala province north of Baghdad are also negotiating with U.S. forces, which have launched a major offensive in the region. Most of the Baghdad tribes cooperating with U.S. forces are Sunni, Welch said, but he didn't have a specific breakdown.Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said this week that his government objected to the arming of various tribes "because this will create new militias."U.S. commanders are urging al-Maliki to bring the tribes into the legitimate security forces in order to avoid creating militias outside government control. "The goal is to tap into the movement, but not create a threat," Welch said. "If it continues and the government doesn't thwart it, it will be a huge event."Iraq's government has started to recruit some Baghdad tribe members into the police, Welch said.Tribal leaders in Baghdad are less influential than in Anbar. "In Anbar, tribal engagement appears to be the answer," said Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant, chief of plans for the American division in Baghdad. "In Baghdad it's not going to be the answer. It's going to be part of the answer." The United States will keep working with al-Maliki's government, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said during a weekend visit to Baghdad, but it can't ignore the result from such "ground up" negotiations with tribes.

On the offensive in Diyala and Maysan Provinces..

New York Times Damien Cave http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/18/news/iraq.php BAGHDAD: U.S. and Iraqi troops began major military operations outside of Baghdad on Monday, while deep in the south near the Iranian border, a ferocious battle between U.S. troops and Shiite militants left at least 20 dead and scores more wounded, Iraqi and U.S. officials said. The southern clash took place in Amara and Majjar al-Kabir, mostly Shiite towns just north of Basra. It came as troops fanned out across Iraq in what U.S. commanders have described as a broad offensive against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia in the provinces surrounding Baghdad.In Diyala Province, north of Baghdad, which has been the site of particularly vicious sectarian violence, witnesses said Iraqi security forces had moved into an area of western Baquba before dawn, encountering little armed resistance. The Iraqi forces were joined by members of the 1920s Revolutionary Brigade, who have rejected a long-standing alliance with Al Qaeda. Witnesses said the combined force was welcomed with demands from residents for more help in stopping the bloodshed and ridding Iraq of the Americans. "Why didn't you do this in the past?" said a man who gave his name as Abu Muhammad. He held the hands of a police captain and a 1920s Brigade commander, and said: "If you work together you can secure Iraq, and the occupation will have no choice but to leave. But if you stay divided, Al Qaeda will stay and the occupation will stay."The operation led to the deaths of at least four people whom the Iraqi police called terrorists. Another 14 were arrested and a large arms cache seized, the police said. In Amara, capital of Maysan Province, which borders Iran, the fighting started early in the morning during raids on what U.S. officials described as a secret network involved in transporting "lethal aid" from Iran, particularly the parts for roadside bombs using shaped charges. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Garver, a U.S. military spokesman here, said U.S. troops had intensified their focus on finding and dismantling places where such bombs are built because the parts are especially hard to stop at the border.The fighting involved members of the Mahdi militia, loyal to the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, according to Sadr officials in Basra, and the battle appeared to be the largest clash with Sadr's loosely affiliated gunmen since February.U.S. troops led the raid and reported no casualties, Garver said. British forces played a support role, a British military official said.According to a U.S. military statement, troops came under withering small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenade attacks, forcing commanders to call in air support. Attack aircraft strafed the buildings and destroyed a vehicle being used "as a fighting position," the statement said, wounding six suspects and leading to the detention of one of the gunmen.At least 60 people were wounded, according to a hospital official.A few hours later, members of the Mahdi militia marched alongside the coffins of those killed, said Abdul Karim al-Muhammadawi, a senior tribal and political figure in Amara."They left because there was no one to fight," he said, adding that by the afternoon, "it was quiet.""The armed presence of the Mahdi army was gone," he said.

Palestinians loot Arafat's home, steal Nobel Prize..

In the "well isn't that kind of ironic" category for the day, Palestinian terrorists break into the chief terrorist's home and ransack it before other terrorists then kill them. Sounds lovely! Looters raid Arafat's home, steal his Nobel Peace Prize Khaled Abu Toameh, THE JERUSALEM POST Enraged Fatah leaders on Saturday accused Hamas militiamen of looting the home of former Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat in Gaza City. "They stole almost everything inside the house, including Arafat's Nobel Peace Prize medal," said Ramallah-based Fatah spokesman Ahmed Abdel Rahman. "Hamas militiamen and gangsters blew up the main entrance to the house before storming it. They stole many of Arafat's documents and files, gifts he had received from world leaders and even his military outfits." Abdel Rahman said the attackers also raided the second floor of the house and stole the personal belongings of his widow, Suha, and daughter, Zahwa. "They stole all the widow's clothes and shoes," he added. "They also took Arafat's pictures with his daughter." Eyewitnesses told The Jerusalem Post that dozens of Palestinians participated in the raid, which took place late Friday. "Most of the looters were just ordinary citizens," they said. "They stole almost everything, including furniture, tiles, water pipes, closets and beds." According to the Fatah spokesman, the raid on Arafat's house, which has been empty since 2001, occurred despite promises from Syria-based Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal to prevent such an attack. "The Palestinian people will never forgive the Hamas gangs for looting the home of the Palestinian people's great leader, Yasser Arafat," Abdel Rahman said. "This crime will remain a stain of disgrace on the forehead of Hamas and its despicable gangs." The homes of several other Fatah leaders have also been looted over the past few days, Palestinian reporters in Gaza City said over the weekend. Among them are the homes of Muhammad Dahlan and Intisar al-Wazir (Um Jihad). Wazir complained that looters stole her jewelry, furniture, clothes and family albums and the personal belongings of her husband, Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), a top PLO leader who was assassinated by Israel in 1988 in Tunis. She said the looting occurred in broad daylight and under the watchful eye of Hamas militiamen. "We don't feel secure any more," she said. "We fear for our lives and property." The Popular Resistance Committees, an alliance of various armed groups, announced over the weekend that its men stormed Dahlan's house and confiscated a suitcase full of gold, forged US and Pakistani passports and an ID card belonging to Nissim Toledano, an Israeli Border Police officer from Lod who was kidnapped and murdered by Hamas in December 1992. Following the raid, hundreds of Palestinians rampaged the house and stole all of Dahlan's furniture and clothes. Dahlan and some 80 top Fatah officials are now staying in hotels in Ramallah. On Friday night, a group of 15 senior Fatah security commanders arrived in the city after Israel gave them permission to leave the Gaza Strip. At least 150 other Fatah security commanders and activists have fled to Egypt aboard fishing boats. The Fatah officials who fled to Ramallah had been abducted by Hamas militiamen late Thursday night and released a few hours later. They include Jamal Kayed, commander of the PA's National Security Force; Musbah al-Buhaisi, commander of Abbas's Presidential Guard, and his deputy, Hamoudeh al-Sheikh; Tawfik Abu Khoussa, Fatah's spokesman in the Gaza Strip; and Majed Abu Shamalah, a Fatah legislator. "What's happening in the Gaza Strip these days reminds me of the first days after the US invasion of Baghdad," said Omar al-Ghul, a columnist from Gaza City. "In Baghdad, the Iraqis stole everything they could get their hands on inside Iraqi ministries and institutions. And in Gaza City the Palestinians stormed security installations and stole everything, including windows, doors and food."

Palestinian video shows white hot hate in Gaza Strip

Video captures white-hot hate that is Fuelling Gaza conflict document.write Jun 17, 2007 04:30 AM Diaa Hadid Associated Press Gaza City–Women screeched in celebration and a gathering mob shouted: "Film the dog, film the dog!" as a battered body was dragged through a dusty hallway, then shot twice, ending the life of Fatah militiaman Samih Madhoun. The grisly footage appeared on militant websites yesterday, reflecting the bitter hatred fuelling the factional war that last week saw well-equipped Hamas militants rout their Fatah rivals in the Gaza Strip. The Islamist militants had longed to kill Madhoun, leader of a 1,500-member special force set up by Fatah to counter Hamas's highly motivated Executive Force fighters. The grainy, 34-second clip concludes with a large crowd kicking Madhoun's body before the camera cuts away to a masked gunman making a call to prayer. For his part, Madhoun had boasted in a radio interview of his role in kidnapping and killing Hamas members. He publicly vowed to "slaughter" more of his enemies "like sheep in the streets" after Hamas torched his house.

Nothing like Hamas murdering other Arabs..

From Hugh Hewitts blog this morning: "Some reports out of Gaza yesterday indicated that Hamas had simply executed Fatah prisoners in the casually brutal style associated with the Taliban's years of power in Afghanistan. The reports I have read today do not dwell on these mentions from yesterday, and seem intent on downplaying the seismic nature of the Hamas coup in Gaza. This bit did leak through into the New York Times: "Bystanders were shocked. Ghassan Hashem, 37, a civil servant, said: “I see Iraq here. There is no mercy. We are afraid. See how ferocious this fight was? There is no future for us.”Islam Shahwan, a spokesman for the Hamas militia, told Hamas radio triumphantly: “The era of justice and Islamic rule have arrived.” And this:The battle for the Preventive Security compound lasted 24 hours, and neighbors said they saw members of the force who surrendered being shot in the legs. Others reported having witnessed executions. The Washington Post's account begins with Hamas' declaration of "amnesty" and hopeful words about "reconciliation": Victorious Hamas gunmen rounded up senior military leaders of the Fatah movement in the Gaza Strip early Friday, then announced a general amnesty in a sign the Islamic movement is seeking to reconcile with its secular rivals after five days of fierce fighting. Buried deep in the story is this graph: Witnesses said Hamas fighters led Fatah officers from the building at gunpoint -- some shirtless, others injured, with hands raised. Some Hamas men fell to their knees and prayed. Another group raised the green Hamas banner over the compound.An AP report provided additional detail (HT: LGF): Witnesses, Fatah officials and a doctor reported executions by Hamas militants of defeated Fatah fighters Thursday; Fatah said seven of its men were shot in the head gangland-style. Hamas denied any such killings.Had Israel used even a distant cousin of Hamas' tactics, the international outcry and coverage would have been enormous and enduring. Condemnations would have rolled down on Israel like an avalanche, and would have kept rolling as they do after every clash between Israel and its enemies.But here as we watch the rise of an ominous terrorist enclave just as brutal as the Taliban was or al Qaeda in Iraq is, the world is largely silent, paralyzed at the prospect of condemning an enemy of Israel. "The rise of Hamas in Gaza represents the extension of Iranian influence to Israel's south," Scott Johnson notes at Powerline this morning. "The result is untenable. It constitutes one more chapter in what Churchill called 'the gathering storm.'" He's right of course, but American media seems almost wholly indifferent to this expanding crisis. Democrats can't stop demanding defeat in Iraq long enough to note the connections between the battles in Iraq and those in lebanon and Gaza. It will not be long before al Qaeda's representatives are firmly ensconced in Gaza --they may already be there, and the distinction between Hamas and al Qaeda, like the distinction between Hezbollah and Iran, may already be more academic than real. The connections between Sunni Islamist radicalism and Shia Islamist radicalism are also obvious, and do not appear to be at all troubled by the savage sectarian blows one delivers the other in various cities around Iraq. It is very confusing for the Western media eager for a storyline that makes Bush the prime mover behind the world's troubles, but the blindness of the Beltway-Manhattan media elites doesn't give an excuse to the political leadership in D.C. The fall of Gaza to radical Islamist totalitarians with a deep desire to destroy Israel completely and a certain receptivity to terrorists eager to strike at Europe and the U.S. is the worst news since 9/11.

hamas is winning the palestinian civil war

At least 25 Palestinians were killed and 80 were wounded as Hamas fighters overran two of Fatah's most important security installations in the Gaza Strip on Thursday. Witnesses said the victors dragged vanquished gunmen from the building and shot them to death gangland-style in the street in front of their families. The headquarters of the General Security Service, commanded by Ramallah-based General Tawfik Tirawi, fell to Hamas gunmen. Hamas said documents it found there prove that the Fatah-affiliated security apparatus has close ties with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Hamas said it would show the documents on television in the coming hours. Elsewhere, the capture of the Preventive Security headquarters was a major step forward in Hamas's attempts to complete its takeover of all of Gaza. Hamas followed up that victory by demanding Fatah surrender another key security installation. Hamas also overran the southern city of Rafah, the second of Gaza's four main towns to fall into the Islamic group's hands. Later Thursday, an explosion rocked Gaza City, and smoke was seen rising from a security post. Fatah security officials said forces positioned at the post had redeployed elsewhere and blown it up as they left, rather than let Hamas take it over. Earlier, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, for the first time in five days of fierce fighting, ordered his elite presidential guard to strike back. But his forces were crumbling fast under the onslaught by the better-armed and better-disciplined Islamic fighters. A Hamas military victory in Gaza would split Palestinian territory into two, with the Islamic extremists controlling the coastal strip and Fatah ruling the West Bank. Israel was watching the carnage closely, concerned the clashes might spawn attacks on the southern border. Defense Minister Amir Peretz told a weekly meeting of security officials that Israel would not allow the violence to spread into attacks on southern Israel, meeting participants said. The battle for the Preventive Security complex brought the day's death toll to 25 by mid-afternoon, hospital and security officials said. About 90 people, most of them gunmen but including children and other civilians, have been killed since a spike in violence Sunday sent Gaza into civil war. Fatah said Hamas shot to death seven of its fighters outside the Preventive Security building. A doctor at Shifa Hospital, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal, said he examined two bodies that had been shot in the head at close range. A witness, who identified himself only as Amjad, said men were killed before their wives and children. "They are executing them one by one," Amjad said in a telephone interview, declining to give his full name for fear of reprisals. "They are carrying one of them on their shoulders, putting him on a sand dune, turning him around and shooting." As Hamas took this major battle spoil, the Palestine Liberation Organization's top body recommended that Abbas declare a state of emergency and dismantle Fatah's governing coalition with Hamas. Abbas said he would review the recommendations and make a decision within hours, said an aide, Nabil Amr. After the rout at the Preventive Security complex, some of the Hamas fighters kneeled down outside, touching their foreheads to the ground in prayer. Others led Fatah gunmen out of the building, some shirtless or in their underwear, holding their arms in the air. Several of the Fatah men flinched as the crack of gunfire split the air. "We are telling our people that the past era has ended and will not return," Islam Shahawan, a Hamas spokesman, told Hamas radio. "The era of justice and Islamic rule have arrived." Sami Abu Zuhri, another Hamas spokesman, heralded what he called "Gaza's second liberation," after the 2005 disengagement. Gunmen and civilians were looting the compound, hauling out computers, documents, office equipment, furniture and TVs. Hamas had been tightening its ring around the Preventive Security complex for three days, stepping up its assault late Wednesday, with a barrage of bullets, grenades, mortar rounds and land mines that continued until the compound fell. Electricity and telephone lines were cut, and roads leading to the complex were blocked. Hamas claimed it confiscated two cars filled with arms sent as reinforcements. The Islamic group was also training its guns Thursday at three other key command centers in Gaza City. In a broadcast on Hamas radio, the Islamic fighters demanded that Fatah surrender the National Security compound by mid-afternoon. Light clashes were taking place there when the ultimatum was delivered. Rocket-propelled grenades were also being fired toward Abbas's Gaza compound, provoking return fire from his presidential guard. For the first time since the fighting began, Abbas ordered his guard to go on the offensive against Hamas at the compound, and not simply maintain a defensive posture, an aide said. The intelligence service compound was under siege as well, with Hamas firing dozens of rocket-propelled grenades in its direction. In Gaza's south, Hamas trounced Fatah in Rafah, taking over the Preventive Security building in that town. It was the second main Gaza city to fall to the Islamists, who captured nearby Khan Younis on Wednesday. "I can see the Preventive Security building in front of me. Hamas has raised its green flags over it," a civilian resident, who identified himself only as Raed, said by telephone. "There are men carrying away equipment from inside. ... (The Fatah-allied) National Security men ran away." Hospitals were operating without water, electricity and blood. Even holed up inside their homes, Gazans weren't able to escape fighting that turned apartment buildings into battlefields. Moean Hammad, 34, said life had become a nightmare at his high-rise building near the Preventive Security headquarters, where Fatah forces on the rooftop were battling Hamas fighters. "We spent our night in the hallway outside the apartment because the building came under cross-fire," Hammad said. "We haven't had electricity for two days, and all we can hear is shooting and powerful, earth-shaking explosions. "The world is watching us dying and doing nothing to help. God help us, we feel like we are in a real-life horror movie," he said. Shaher Hatoum, a nurse at nearby Al Quds Hospital, said the facility had no electricity, water or blood, and that wounded were propped up on ward floors. Hundreds of bullets flew through windows, and fighters ignored the hospital's appeals to hold fire just long enough to have the generator and water pipes fixed, Hatoum said. "We are waiting here for our end," Hatoum said. In Syria, meanwhile, a senior Hamas official warned Fatah to keep the violence contained to Gaza. "This is very dangerous for our people," Moussa Abu Marzouk said by telephone in Damascus, where several top Hamas leaders live in exile.

Palestinian civil war heats up

Palestinian Battles Raise Fears of Coup And Civil War By Scott WilsonWashington Post Foreign ServiceWednesday, June 13, 2007; A01 JERUSALEM, June 12 -- Gunmen loyal to the two main Palestinian parties fought street battles in the Gaza Strip on Tuesday that increasingly bore the hallmarks of civil war, as Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, a Fatah leader, warned that the rival Hamas movement was attempting a coup. At least two dozen Palestinian fighters and three civilians were killed in the third consecutive day of clashes, the largest one-day total in 18 months of periodic factional conflict. The attacks brought the three-day death toll in Gaza to at least 42 people and to more than 90 so far this year. The two parties have different visions of a future Palestinian state, with Fatah favoring peace with Israel and Hamas advocating its eradication, but they are battling now over the control of various Palestinian security forces and the resulting opportunities for patronage. The conflict is complicated by U.S. and Israeli efforts to help Fatah contain Hamas, which is supported by Iran. Arrests and a kidnapping Tuesday in Ramallah, in the West Bank, suggested that the internal conflict could spread to the more populous of the Palestinian territories. The West Bank has remained largely free from the cycle of attack and reprisal that has marked the factional strife to date. Gunmen fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the Gaza home of Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas, an attack denounced by officials of the Islamic movement as an assassination attempt even though he was not there at the time. Soon after, several mortar shells fell near the Gaza compound of Abbas, who was in Ramallah. The choice of targets suggested a further loosening of restraint by the armed men loyal to each party. Human Rights Watch said in a statement Tuesday that Hamas and Fatah gunmen had summarily executed captives and killed bystanders. Such acts "are war crimes, pure and simple," said Sarah Leah Whitson, the organization's Middle East director. The power struggle had intensified after Hamas defeated Fatah in January 2006 parliamentary elections, giving Hamas day-to-day control of the government and prompting Western donors to cut off aid to the Palestinian Authority, further impoverishing Gaza's 1.4 million residents. The two parties have sat in a power-sharing government since March that has united them in name only. Late Tuesday, the Fatah Central Committee voted to suspend the party's participation in the government until the fighting stops. In a statement issued by his office Tuesday, Abbas, elected to succeed the late Yasser Arafat in January 2005, said, "The political and military leaders of Hamas are planning a coup against the legitimate institutions, thinking they will be able to control the Gaza Strip by force." The Bush administration has approved $40 million to train and supply nonlethal equipment to security forces loyal to Abbas in order to improve Fatah's military position against a smaller but better trained Hamas force in Gaza. The money is arriving now. Hamas officials have begun identifying the Fatah-controlled forces as allies of Israel and the United States, which both classify Hamas, formally known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, as a terrorist organization. Over a minaret loudspeaker in Gaza City, Hamas on Tuesday ordered Fatah forces to surrender military posts, threatening to "attack the positions of the Zionist collaborators." Hamas forces surrounded smaller Fatah posts in northern, central and southern Gaza, controlling the entrances. Then, under cover of nightfall, several hundred Hamas fighters attacked a hilltop post of the Palestinian National Forces, whose ranks include Fatah members, in the northern Jabalya refugee camp. Using small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, Hamas fighters took control of the post after intense fighting. Palestinian hospital officials said at least 23 fighters from Hamas and Fatah were killed and more than 30 were wounded. It was perhaps the largest single assault in the factional fighting to date. In a statement later in the evening, Hamas's military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, acknowledged that at least seven of its gunmen were killed by what it described as the "Jew-American army" of Fatah. "All stability -- from political to security -- is being threatened by the Fatah groups," said Fawzi Barhoum, a Hamas spokesman in Gaza. "Now there is a war against Hamas's military force. The situation is going from bad to worse." Gazans largely remained indoors, although high school students continued with classes despite the numerous roadblocks, barricades and rooftop gun emplacements set up by of armed men in masks. Egyptian mediators failed to forge a new cease-fire between the parties. The Hamas delegation could not reach the talks because of roadblocks and other security concerns. Lt. Col. Burhan Hamad, head of the Egyptian delegation, said the Hamas delegation told him the talks were like "giving aspirin to a patient with a fatal disease." Just after noon, Hamas gunmen attacked the home of Hassan Mohsen, whom they identified as a senior officer in the Fatah-controlled Preventive Security Service, even though his relatives said he worked for a rescue unit assigned to Gaza's beaches. Witnesses said the Hamas men blasted through the front door, killing Mohsen's wife, a daughter and a niece. After seeing the dead women, witnesses said, the Hamas gunmen fled. Later, a member of the Fatah-controlled security services was killed during fighting in the Shati refugee camp in Gaza City where Haniyeh lives. His family said the man was killed by "Shia," a reference to the support that Hamas, a Sunni Muslim movement, receives from the Shiite government of Iran. In Ramallah, officers from Abbas's presidential guard closed the office of the Hamas-run al-Aqsa television channel after detaining several men there allegedly taking pictures of the presidential compound. Not long after, witnesses said, gunmen who belong to Fatah's armed wing, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, seized Faidi Shabaneh, the vice minister of transportation from Hamas. His fate was unknown.

Marin 2/6 RCT begins new operation alljah

June 12, 2007; By Cpl. Joel Abshier, Regimental Combat Team 6 Lance Cpl. Jordan P. Bremm watches Iraqi civilians attempt to fix a downed power line while standing duty during an operation in Fallujah on June 2. Marines and sailors with 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, and Combat Logistics Battalion 6, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, both with II Marine Expeditionary Force, recently completed the first step in the ongoing mission, Operation Alljah, in the city of Fallujah. Bremm is a rifleman and assistant gunner in Company F, 2/6. Lance Cpl. Jordan P. Bremm routinely scans over the entry point to their compound during an operation in Fallujah on June 2. Marines and sailors with 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, and Combat Logistics Battalion 6, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, both with II Marine Expeditionary Force, recently completed the first step in the ongoing mission, Operation Alljah, in the city of Fallujah. Bremm is a rifleman and assistant gunner in Company F, 2/6. A Marine takes a photo of a new Iraqi Police recruit for documentation purposes during an operation in Fallujah on June 2. Marines and sailors with 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, and Combat Logistics Battalion 6, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, both with II Marine Expeditionary Force, recently completed the first step in the ongoing mission, Operation Alljah, in the city of Fallujah. An Iraqi Police officer watches Iraqi civilians who are waiting in line to become Iraqi Police officers during an operation in Fallujah on June 2. Marines and sailors with 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, and Combat Logistics Battalion 6, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, both with II Marine Expeditionary Force, recently completed the first step in the ongoing mission, Operation Alljah, in the city of Fallujah. Cpl. Andrew D. Miller keeps a watchful eye on local civilians who are waiting in line to become Iraqi Police officers during an operation in Fallujah on June 2. Marines and sailors with 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, and Combat Logistics Battalion 6, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, both with II Marine Expeditionary Force, recently completed the first step in the ongoing mission, Operation Alljah, in the city of Fallujah. Miller is the police sergeant with Headquarters and Service Company, 2/6.FALLUJAH, Iraq (June 12, 2007) -- Marines and Sailors with 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, and Combat Logistics Battalion 6, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, both with Multi-National Forces-West, recently completed the first phase of “Operation Alljah” in the city of Fallujah.The mission of Operation Alljah is to provide stability and protection for the citizens of Fallujah. For this iteration of the operation, Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 6, 2nd Marine Logistics Group Forward, emplaced concrete barriers to section the city into precincts; leathernecks with 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 6, worked with the Iraqi Police and Army to set up operational stations. At these stations, Iraqi civilians can come in to receive identification cards, food, reimbursements and a chance to join the neighborhood watch program.“The operation is similar to what another unit did in the city of Ramadi,” said Maj. George S. Benson, executive officer of 2/6. “We’re capitalizing on the success of Ramadi and using many of the same techniques.”“It’s great in theory and it’s bold. Hopefully this will give that last little bit of pressure onto the local population to go ahead and take charge,” admitted 1st. Lt. Justin Hunter, commander of 4th Platoon, C Company, 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, attached to 2/6.“I was waiting for this opportunity,” said Col. Faisal, Police Chief of Fallujah. “This is one of the successful steps we have made because it (gives) security and protection in this area for the citizens of Fallujah.”Alljah is a complex plan with many moving parts. The first of these parts to kick into motion were Hunter’s engineers. Once arriving at their destination, an abandoned school, combat engineers immediately began laying the groundwork for the first step: fortification of an abandoned school. This concrete compound would ultimately serve as the headquarters during the beginning phase of Operation Alljah.“Operation Alljah is our chance of giving a small sliver of pie to the local population,” Hunter said. “Instead of owning or trying to take care of the entire city themselves, we give them a small district. It’s prompting them to take charge of their own city.”The logistically-heavy combat engineers unloaded a mountain of sandbags and numerous bunkers, which were constructed days before the operation kicked off, to be placed on the roof of the school. “We worked through the night,” said Hunter, after he and his Marines unloaded, carried and placed hundreds of sandbags throughout the abandoned school-turned-headquarters for the operation. “We are providing force protection and trying to build up as much as we can overnight so in the morning, when everything’s done, the insurgents will wake up, look around and not really have a chance to engage the (Iraqi Police) or Iraqi Army.”Working side-by-side, Marines with F Company , 2/6, and Iraqi Army soldiers patrol and monitor the area surrounding their newly fortified compound. “Our job is to (help) the Iraqis control the area,” said Mechanicsville, Md., native Lance Cpl. Jordan P. Bremm, a rifleman and assistant gunner in F Company. In the street near Bremm’s entry control point, many Iraqi civilians gathered around a downed power pole. While keeping an eye on the growing collection of civilians, Bremm added, “This pole came down in the middle of the night taking a lot of power with it. They are all out here trying to fix it.”While the entrances were under the scrutinizing eyes of Marines with F Company, hundreds of Iraqi civilians, who have been searched for suspicious materials and weapons, lined up along the walls inside the compound and patiently waited to take advantages of the many services being offered at the new precinct headquarters: claims for damages, identification cards, food distribution, neighborhood watch recruitment, and hundreds of people came to inquire about joining the Iraqi police.“We’re doing minimal physical screening to make sure these guys are not grossly ill,” said Navy Lt. Matt A. Swain, the 2/6 battalion surgeon. “What we’re doing is setting up a screening to see if they can be an IP. If they need actual care for something, we refer them to their Iraqi health care infrastructure.”Along with the medical screening, the Iraqis went through a methodical identification process that included retina scans and fingerprinting.“Once this information is gathered, we enter it into our (Biometrics Automated Toolset) system,” said Sgt. Mark A. Taggart, BAT system noncommissioned officer-in-charge with 2/6. “If they do have an (identification) card with them, we’ll do a quick scan to check and see if they are already enrolled in our computer system. We’ll update any information we can and if they have an expired card or don’t have one at all, we’ll give them a new one. Basically everyone gets an ID card that comes in here.”Iraqis with I.D. cards can use them to move more quickly through entry control points that are located in many places within the city. “When they hand us their cards, we can look in the system and figure out who they are and whether they have connections with known individuals involved in any circles of insurgency,” Taggart said. “In the end, we are trying to make life easier for everyone. Iraqis just want to get on with their lives. We’re here to make sure it happens.”Several local nationals also sought out the Marines who could help them with monetary reimbursements for damages caused by Coalition Forces operating within the city.“If US forces damage particular personal property then individuals are authorized to come in,” said Chief Warrant Officer 3 Doug Hoelscher, the Camp Fallujah disbursing officer with CLB-6. “An amount is then determined and disbursers from various detachments, either embedded with them or are out with the unit, reimburse the individuals for the damage we created.”Damages such as kicked-in doors or knocked out windows were common situations when the Marines were approached with claims.“It’s not meant to be dollar-to-dollar reimbursement for the damage they sustained,” said Capt. John A. Schwab, a Marine lawyer with 2/6. “This is our offering of sympathy for what happens. It’s not an admission of guilt that we did anything wrong. We are basically saying we’re sorry for what happened and we’re sympathetic for the damage that was sustained and we’re willing to reimburse (a certain) amount for that damage.”Throughout the operation, security at both the entry points and rooftop provide ample security for the individuals inside, however, it didn’t stop the insurgency from attempting to disrupt the operation. Small-arms fire and frequent other attacks on the compound were routinely heard throughout the mission.“Better get your gear on,” said Master Sgt. Lorenzo Jones, the communications chief for 2/6, after an explosion detonated; vibrating the walls, ceasing all conversation within the building and henceforth causing Marines to focus on the safety of everyone inside and out of the building.No Marines were injured in the duration of the small attacks, however, the steady sounds of small arms fire proved a grave reminder that Fallujah is not a city to be taken for granted.Hunkered down behind a cement wall, one Iraqi Soldier, Naem Salim Chali, smiles and explains that this kind of situation is normal. He continues to say that hostility from insurgents is decreasing extensively all the time. “It’s actually safer here now,” he said. “When the bad guys see the Marines coming, they always run.”

More business development in iraq

MNF-I initiative provides contracts to Iraqi businesses Monday, 11 June 2007 MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER BAGHDAD: Multi-National Force–Iraq is providing new business and employment opportunities for Iraqis within an initiative designed to help boost local economies.The Iraqi-based Industrial Zone (I-BIZ) initiative plays a role in rebuilding Iraq and underscores a unity of purpose and effort among the Coalition force and logistics support contractors to bring Iraqi companies into the domestic and international marketplace. Under I-BIZ the Coalition provides secure areas for Iraqis to develop their businesses such as laundries, carpentry shops, air conditioning repairs, generator repairs, vehicle repairs, bakeries, waste management, recycling, and retail sales.I-BIZ, which was in development for twelve months, is part of MNF-I’s wider economic efforts and fosters small business creation and economic stimulus by providing local Iraqi businesses contracts for servicing Coalition bases.Many of the contracts previously awarded to international companies will now be awarded to Iraqi owned businesses.“Let's get Iraqis employed, get them out of the bomb-making business and into the support-providing business,” said Brig. Gen. Steven Anderson, MNF-I deputy chief of staff for Resources and Sustainment. “The long term objective is to expand Iraqi business to service Iraqi communities, not just bases.”I-BIZ includes eleven candidate locations across Iraq including the two year old I-BIZ site at Camp Echo in Diwaniyah, where nearly 200 Iraqis are employed.Most of the eleven candidate locations are intended to become operational over the next twelve months.A major I-BIZ site is set to open in August at Camp Victory, Baghdad, and will have the initial capacity for three to six businesses, each potentially employing from two to 20 staff members. Plans are in place to expand the site to up to 25 acres.“Currently there are a significant number of small businesses expressing interest in setting up at the ten acre I-BIZ site near Camp Victory,” Anderson said. “We are thinking big but starting small.”

iraqi air force continues training and improving

Iraqi AF flies high with safety course 5-Jun-07 By Marine Sgt. Jess KentMNC-I PAO BAGHDAD — The first aviation safety class on Iraqi soil was completed last week at New Al Muthana Air Base in Baghdad. Nine Iraqi Air Force pilots and two American Coalition Air Force Transition Team–Iraq members graduated the five-day course, taught jointly by American and Iraqi instructors. The basic course focused on teaching Iraqi pilots about accident prevention and investigation, composite risk management and the duties of safety officers. The pilots were also briefed about helipad and airfield safety surveys, aviation fuel operations and the medical factors a flight crew should consider.These instructions were in addition to flight school at Camp Taji, for Iraqi Air Force pilots spread across the country in three squadrons.“The new Iraqi Air Force has just now started getting off the ground and into the air, so Multi-National Corps-Iraq had school-trained aviation safety officers to enhance their accident- prevention program,” said Chief Warrant Officer Gregory Bonneau, aviation safety officer and class instructor, MNC-I. “We’re really giving them the basics because they’ve had no real formal safety management program.”The basic safety course was the first phase of four. The class instructors will visit bases so each Iraqi pilot can complete a safety assessment during Phase 2. The Iraqi pilots will return to New al Muthana Air Base to discusscommon problems and solutions in Phase 3. A ground safety course completes the program.“The Iraqi Air Force just published its own safety regulation and they’re beginning to build the foundation for their aviation safety program,” Bonneau said. “This was an Iraqi course with some help from us.” Some of the help includes providing a new attitude toward accident prevention and investigation.“Their primary issue right now is overcoming a previous culture under Saddam Hussein which punished when you had accidents,” Bonneau said. “After an accident landing a MiG-25, one of the pilots was put on house arrest and unable to speak to anyone for three months. He was released when they found out it was a maintenance problem. We’re developing a new attitude to identify hazards and use risk management.”The Iraqi pilots are very eager to put what they learned during the course to use, Bonneau said. They already provide C-130 transports, medical evacuations and some intelligence surveillance reconnaissance.“They are real patriots to their country,” Bonneau said. “To make their Air Force and country better, they put their lives on the line outside the wire every day, and for me that puts into perspective what we do here.”Iraqi Air Force Maj. Ala’din Mughir is one of those patriots. He said life is much different as a pilot now than it was under Saddam Hussein’s Air Force. Mughir graduated from the Iraqi Air Force College in 1986. After the invasion of Iraq, he stepped down as a pilot. He joined the new Iraqi Air Force in 2004.“Under Saddam, Iraq was away from the world and the way it changed over the years,” Mughir said. “We were prevented from traveling and using the Internet. We had only the local channels. We did not know what was going on in the world. So before 2003, we did not have a program to concentrate on flight safety.”Mughir learned a lot of useful information during the class. With the newfound knowledge, he plans to meet with his commander to establish a safety council for his unit. Mughir said the instructors were kind and very helpful, and he is honored to have them in Iraq as friends to the pilots rebuilding the Iraqi Air Force.“It was our honor to teach them because it is such an important step in their Air Force development,” Bonneau said. “We learned a lot about each other, about our cultures and families, and we are not just going to do a class and leave them; we are going to be there by their side.”Photo - An Iraqi Air Force flight nurse, tends to wounded Iraqis in a C-130 transport aircraft during a medical evacuation. Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Samuel McLarty.

blogger roundtable with brigadier general phillips

GEN. PHILLIPS: I would just like to say I came back from Habbaniya out in Al Anbar province just the other day, and there are some significant advancements taking---especially since -- I spent three, four months over here in 2003, and then I had a 15-month tour as a brigade commander. Now I'm back over here. And comparing Al Anbar province and what's going on in Habbaniya with the academy to what I saw just months ago is night and day. People are back on the streets, commerce is up and going, and it's not the same -- it's not the same country out there that I saw just a short time ago. MR. HOLT: All right, sir. And that kind of goes to a question that Mark Finkelstein had for General Khalaf, so, Mark, would you want to restate your question for General Phillips? Q Yes, thank you. And thank you very much, General Phillips, for being with us. I had asked the Iraqi general the question of how the presence in Iraqi cities -- you know, like Habbaniya,Ramadi and Fallujah has improved or changed the quality -- the day-to-day quality of life for average Iraqi citizens. And I think, you know, you have now addressed that, but if I could invite you to expand on that, we'd appreciate it. GEN. PHILLIPS: Sure. Right now you're seeing many of the tribes, the families -- and it appears they've had their fill of al Qaeda, of the terrorism that's going on, and losing their sons and daughters is just having their livelihoods torn apart. As you know, Al Anbar was an absolute combat zone. That was about as down and dirty as you could get. But now they've rallied together. They're allowing their sons to go to the academies and train to be police officers, and they have their local groups, which are basically like community watch groups -they're working hand in hand with the Marine forces out there and the Army forces that are out there. They're turning in the insurgents. They're turning in caches of weapons. And I have to tell you that commerce is working, the stores are back open, and you get small kids on the streets now waving as you go by in a humvee. You didn't see that a few months back. Q Okay. That's the sort of information I was looking for. Just a quick point of clarification, I was at Camp Habbaniya in November, and I know that it's a training site for the Iraqi 1st Army Division. Is Habbaniya also a training site for Iraqi police? GEN. PHILLIPS: Correct. Just recently an agreement was reached between the minister of Interior and the minister of Defense to open the Al Anbar-Habbaniya Iraqi Police Academy, and we did some construction out there.We put 750 students through the course at any given time, and it's right on the facility, almost within walking distance from the 1st IA Division Headquarters. But that there is a big step in and of itself that the army and the police are starting to work together; as you know, that's been somewhat problematic at times. Q Now, there was a Marine unit that had responsibility for the Iraq 1st Army Division training. Is there a separate Marine or Army division that is in charge, or is it all through CPATT for the police side of things? GEN. PHILLIPS: Well, actually, I would like to say this is Iraqi-led. Although we have about 15 personnel that are advisers out there from CPATT, the instructors are all Iraqi, the administration of the academy is Iraqi, and it's really totally run -- other than a little bit of tutelage, guidance and mentoring there; we do have some Marines that are providing oversight on the life support contracts to make sure that water, ice, food is all delivered. But short of that, this is an Iraqi-run academy on an Iraqi military installation. Q Okay. Very interesting. Thank you. MR. HOLT: All right. And I believe that kind of leads into the question that David Axe has. So David, if you want to expand or follow up? Q Oh, I don't really want to repeat the question I had before with the Iraqi -- MR. HOLT: Okay. But General, thanks for taking the time. I really appreciate it. And I'd like to ask you about the interface between the Iraqi police and the Iraqi judicial system. Are you seeing any improvements there? GEN. PHILLIPS: Yes, and I can compare that back to 2003, 2004 and early 2005 and to now. You are seeing it start to get better. And as you know, we increased and grew the Iraqi police, but we didn't increase and grow the Iraqi judicial system simultaneously at the same speed. Therefore, as the police would execute their duties, arrest and apprehend people off the streets for various crimes, they would sit in their detention cells because there was very few investigative judges to take them to. Well, now with General Petraeus' initiative, we have the rule of law -- the rule of law zone that we're putting together, and it's really a complex. It's where we have investigative judges, investigators, holding cells, and an actual prison. So now the Iraqi police are able to bring somebody that they've arrested before an investigative judge and a determination is to be made whether or not to hold the individual for additional investigation and subsequent prosecution, or to release him because of a lack of evidence. That's the long pole in the tent we didn't see recently. That is why the Iraqi police jail cells in their individual police stations were getting so overcrowded, and you know any time you get overcrowding in a jail, it's a conviction -- is set and right for our problem. But now that we have the judges up and starting to run cases and they have their investigators at the Rule of Law Complex, which is on the other side of the river, adjacent to the Ministry of the Interior complex, we're starting to get the flow going. We've got initiatives to open Rule of Law Complexes up in Mosul and some of the other large cities so that once a person is detained, they can expeditiously go in front of an investigative judge. I wouldn't say it's perfect yet, but we have come a long way in just about a year's time frame. Q General, sorry, a point of clarification. This first Rule of Law Complex is where? GEN. PHILLIPS: It's on the east side of Baghdad near the Ministry of Interior building, adjacent to the Baghdad Police College. Q All right. GEN. PHILLIPS: It's a whole complex where you have the MOJ, the Ministry of Justice, working side by side with the Ministry of the Interior, the police. The traffic headquarters is near that area. But it's a whole complex area where all of the different agencies come together and then try to execute the rule of law -- the triad -- from the police, to the judicial, to the confinement. Q General, thanks. You have mentioned that before. But in a -- so I understand the process has improved, or at least the infrastructure has improved, but what about the attitudes? Are you seeing just a better spirit of cooperation between these two ministries? GEN. PHILLIPS: Yes. And you know, that's been problematic in the past. It is very territorial. But what you just saw with Habbaniya and the Police Academy, between minister of Defense and Interior to work this out, where you're now seeing between the Ministry of the Interior who gave up land to the minister of Justice for this complex. In the past, we would not have seen that happen, at least not with(out) a lot of work. So yes, it's getting better. Not perfect. But I'm very optimistic about this, especially being a career military policeman, I've grown up with the rule of law, and to see it now starting to get practiced over here, I'm optimistic. Q Thank you very much. MR. HOLT: Okay, Andrew. Q Thanks. General, a quickie question. Listening to these stories of the Sunnis and the Marines in Anbar, which is -- thank God we're hearing this now -- that a lot of this works because the Sunnis are -- they got the cooperation of the leadership of the Sunni chieftains. What's going to happen in Baghdad when you don't have that? You know, how do the -- the IAs there seem to be more Shi'a oriented and JAM-led than IA-led. GEN. PHILLIPS: That's one of the biggest problems I think you can see over here that we're having to wrestle with, it's where you have the crossroads between the different sects, between the Shi'a and the Sunni. Baghdad is a crossroads where you have Christian, you have Kurdish, you have different sects from Sunni to Shi'a, and wherever you have that, we see that you can have flashpoints. Al Anbar, as you know, is predominantly Sunni, whereas down south we have predominately Shi'a. That's why there's such an emphasis going on with our search here to try to get a reconciliation between the groups, such as we saw in South Africa years ago when Nelson Mandela came up and, you know, led the way for reconciliation and said I don't care that I was in jail all that time, I forgive you. And then we saw some great leaps there. That is what we're looking to see happen here. And we're waiting for those senior leaders to come forward and do that handshake. At this point, it's still problematic and you'regoing to have those flashpoints wherever you have a crossroads. Q Do the people still look at the IA or the IP there as essentially being corrupt and beingShi'a-led or Shi'a-oriented? I'm not sure what term I'm looking for there. GEN. PHILLIPS: Well, I guess, I would say, do they look at them in Baghdad as being Shi'a or Jaish al-Mahdi, JAM-influenced? I would say, there are those out there that see that and say that. But also, just to tell you, the other day I drove across the 3rd ID bridge. And there's kids playing in some areas where I never saw them playing before, and I saw policemen on the street. And I didn't know if those were Shi'a or Sunni policemen. But the fact that families were letting their kids play there, again, shows that there is some faith in the fact that these policemen are out there. But yes, you're always going to have some people suspect that the police are corrupt. But let me ask this. If you look at any other police department in the world, regardless of the country, and if you templated on them the insurgency and the terrorists that we have here, I wonder how they would stand up to it., If you took the insurgency and terrorists away, I would argue that the Iraqi police force in Baghdad would rival any other like-size city in this region of the world. But once you have the mix of combat that's going on, the police -- we train them to be cops. We don't train them to be soldiers, and they are definitely outgunned. But are people suspect? Yes. And are there bad policemen? Every department has bad policemen. Are there more here than other places? Well, we've got some problems. But the internalaffairs organization is working ruthlessly to capture them and take them into custody. I heard just yesterday that six were arrested for not only accepting bribes but doing a whole bunch of other stuff they shouldn't have been doing. That's a positive thing, that they were at least arrested. Q Is that Iraqi internal affairs or ours? GEN. PHILLIPS: That's Iraqi internal affairs, which is led by -- (name inaudible) -- who I knew since he was a major back in 2003. He has probably one of the most dangerous jobs over here, not to say -- to take away from any other job. But he is investigating the Iraqi police and all of the different -- he actually gets other missions, too by direction of the prime minister. He reports to the minister of the Interior, and he handles all the ugly stuff internal. There's a lot of people that would like to see him fail at his job. There have been multiple attempts on his life. But he's still out there, and he's still doing it. Q Okay, great, thank you. MR. HOLT: And Jeff, you're next. Q General, thanks for your time. I've got a little bit of a curveball question based more on your background than on your position right now. With -- I was in Baghdad a little while ago embedded, but didn't get out into the countryside or anything like that. And obviously in Baghdad, given the nature of the urban area, there's very little offensive or defensive close air support being used, and therefore very little need for deployment of tactical air controllers or -- (inaudible). How if at all are they being used elsewhere in Iraq? And what kind of air support are we using, as far as our offensive and defensive prosecuting of this post-war? GEN. PHILLIPS: Well, I tell you, I fly by air quite a bit, by helicopters. And I'm a military policemen, so really it would not be my area of expertise. I do know that close air support is out there. We have it available to call in. You don't routinely call them in an urban area. But I'm very confident when I'm out at some of the outlying locations, if I need that close air, it's going to be there for me. I know how to call it in; my security teams know how to call it in. But as for the amount of use in that, I just don't have that type of expertise. Q Thanks a lot. GEN. PHILLIPS: Sure. MR. HOLT: Okay, Mike Goldfarb. Q I'm all right. I'll pass. MR. HOLT: Okay, all right, Jarred. Q Good afternoon, sir. This is Lieutenant Fishman. Even the mainstream media are now reporting great improvements in Anbar province. But are you confident, though, that we'll see Iraqi police and the Iraqi army improvements, both in Baghdad and Diyala province, once we clear those areas of al Qaeda? That seems to be the biggest trouble spots that we're having now. GEN. PHILLIPS: Well, I -- yes, Diyala, up in Baqubah, Baghdad are flashpoints. But it's not only AQI, not only al Qaeda. We have Jaish Al-Mahdi, the JAM elements, too, that are also problematic. So it's just not one group, there's multiple groups. But I'm optimistic now that some of the area that some of the areas that I can go back into and feel relatively safe, get out of my humvee, and to walk the street. I still won't stop into stores, though, because I fear the danger that if I shop and buy bread from a bakery like I did in 2003, that the individual who sold it to me might put himself or his family at risk. But things are improving in some of the areas of Baghdad. I was up in Baqubah the other day, too. There's still some problematic areas, but we do not have a shortage of individuals requesting to join the police. When you hear the suicide bombers inflicting casualties at a recruiting for police, the reason there's casualties is because we have lines of people who still want to join. So I think that's a positive note in and of itself.