al qaedas paper trail in iraq

The Terrorists' Paper Trail in Iraq http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/02/06/the-terrorists-paper-trail-in-iraq_print.htm By Kevin Whitelaw US News and World Report Posted February 6, 2008 More than 600 captured personnel files of foreigners who joined the terrorist group known as Al Qaeda in Iraq tell the individual stories of Muslim extremists who made the difficult journey to Iraq—and most likely died or were captured there. According to the paperwork, Abdallah Awlad al-Tumi met his recruiter at a large mosque in Dublin. Al-Tumi, who was 36, took a flight from Turkey to Syria before entering Iraq, carrying his marriage certificate, a knife, and $5,000 in cash. His occupation back home: "massage specialist." But the records, which were analyzed and released by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, also point out a trait that has been unique to al Qaeda and many of its offshoots: They are surprisingly bureaucratic. "Al Qaeda is different from any other terror group in history because it was so large and had such a sophisticated logistical structure," says Bruce Hoffman, an expert on terrorist groups who teaches at Georgetown University. "It's a bureaucratic pathology." The personnel records are unusually formal, typed on letterhead that reads "Islamic State of Iraq," one of the aliases for al Qaeda in Iraq. Foreign fighters were asked to provide basic biographical details, such as birth date, address, and telephone number, as well as questions aimed at double-checking who referred them to the organization. One Algerian fighter named Aydir describes three coordinators he met in Syria before he was smuggled into Iraq. The first was "tall and strong," the second was "tall and hunchbacked," and the other was "tan and weak." Part of it is simply about logistics. "When you're moving people across international borders, you want to make sure you're keeping track of them," says Hoffman. "But it is also part of a hubris that this is more of an organization than it actually is and to impress the recruits in this martyrdom pipeline that they really are part of something bigger than they are." There is also an aspect of quality control. One question asks recruits: "How did the coordinator treat you in Syria?" Most of the fighters replied, "Well." One even enthuses, "Very excellent." But a few complain of being locked up in an apartment in Syria. One Saudi who arrived in Syria with $1,000 writes, "Not good. Loua'aie took all the money and we are not happy and [he] give us back $200." For Al Qaeda in Iraq, which relies on a loose network of operatives in Syria to help funnel fighters into Iraq, the forms allow leaders to monitor the reliability of their network. "You have the leadership who may be highly committed, but when you get to the handlers, it may be more criminal networks," says Lt. Col. Joseph Felter, who runs the Combating Terrorism Center. "They might be putting in some safeguards to try to identify those individuals who are less ideologically committed down the chain." An additional set of captured documents reveals more about the financing of Al Qaeda in Iraq, suggesting that many recruits carry in substantial sums of money from abroad to help finance operations inside Iraq. Many of the foreign fighters are also being made to sign what amounts to suicide-bombing contracts. These contracts, which will be released in March as part of another Combating Terrorism Center report, have recruits pledging to commit a suicide bombing or be stripped of their al Qaeda in Iraq salary and forced to divorce their wives. "If you're bringing people in, you want to make sure they are operationalized and blowing themselves up quickly," says Brian Fishman, who coauthored the Combating Terrorism Center report on foreign fighters in Iraq. All of these captured documents have helped U.S. intelligence agencies build a clearer picture of the machine behind Iraq's suicide bombers. The stacks of paper formed part of the basis for Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell's testimony to Congress on February 5 that between 50 and 80 foreign terrorists are entering Iraq each month. He described a group that has been weakened but remains capable of carrying out deadly attacks. For intelligence agencies, there are also some potential opportunities to be exploited. Bureaucracy implies a higher level of leadership structure. "The more hierarchical these organizations are, the easier they are to take apart," says Seth Jones, a terrorism expert at Rand Corp., a think tank. "When they become diffuse, you can't really remove one single link and expect the organization to fall." Already, researchers have been trying to trace back the telephone numbers included in the records, as well as the names of intermediaries in Syria. "Just the fact that they had these records was a big security risk," says Felter. "We're hoping it will be useful in stemming the tide from their home countries." The largest number of foreign fighters recorded in these files came from Saudi Arabia, although Libya had the highest per capita representation. The oldest fighter was 54 years old when he crossed into Iraq; the youngest was only 16. The Iraqi records come from between August 2006 and August 2007. At that time, Al Qaeda in Iraq was believed to be led by an Egyptian, Abu Yaquib al-Masri, who previously fought in Afghanistan and was closely allied with Ayman al-Zawahiri, the powerful deputy commander of al Qaeda. Al-Masri most likely picked up his bureaucratic habits watching the original al Qaeda operate in Afghanistan. After U.S. forces ousted the Taliban in 2001, a trove of al Qaeda documents surfaced that showed just how bureaucratic the organization had become, from detailed weapons logs to a complex system of vouchers that allowed fighters to stay at government-run hotels free of charge. "When they were in Afghanistan, al Qaeda really prided itself on its H.R.," says Hoffman. "It gave people annual leave and even a death benefits plan." Al Qaeda also provided a salary—a reminder that militants might be volunteers, but many also are looking for a steady paycheck. "This is a job. They need to feed themselves," says Jones. "Idealism may matter at the top levels, but oftentimes people are motivated by money." It is no wonder, then, that when asked for their profession, many of the recruits in Iraq put down one word: "martyr."